GO-Mobility

Faced with our choices

Data and decision-making processes: a long story short

Behind every big decision, there is big data to support it; or at least there should be. Until recently, there was virtually no debate in this field, but in recent years, the world of transport planning has been embracing a new paradigm that recognizes the design and infrastructure of transport systems as decision-making processes, subject to specific phases, dynamics, and syndromes. In the opening speech of our annual Data Mobility event, Prof. Ennio Cascetta revealed the mechanisms, but also the pitfalls, behind big decisions and how data and quantitative methods can work to improve them and guide the outcome towards what really matters: the consensus of the populations that benefit from or suffer the effects of these decisions.

1. Faced with our choices

Transport decisions involve various actors—especially public decision-makers, but increasingly also private decision-makers—at different territorial scales and for different objectives. There are decisions that have a decade-long impact, such as strategic ones: infrastructure plans, urban sustainable mobility plans, industrial plans concerning, for example, the purchase of rolling stock. These are decisions that affect entire territories or companies for several years. Projects are of a different kind, involving more limited tactical and operational choices, such as the definition of individual interventions.

All these decisions, from plans to mobility projects, are affected in practice by many errors: failures, risks, syndromes, and cognitive biases. But what is the nature of these errors?

2. A system affected by planning fallacies

As the professor explains, the world of transport is a complex system in which decision-makers and stakeholders operate with different, sometimes conflicting, objectives. It is for this reason that decision-making processes in this area are defined in the literature as wicked: ‘malignant’.

Over the decades, evidence of design and planning errors has accumulated to such an extent that a dedicated strand of literature has emerged: ‘planning fallacies’. Through the study of decisions made on road and rail infrastructure projects in various parts of the world, a recurring series of errors affecting this sector has been analyzed and identified. For example, there has been a systematic tendency to overestimate demand, underestimate costs, and underestimate timelines, especially in railway projects: an “error” linked to the desire to demonstrate the necessity of the project (at the expense of the community).

3. The most common syndromes

The most common are DAD syndrome and Penelope syndrome.

The ‘DAD syndrome’ (Decide, Announce, Defend) describes an authoritarian, top-down approach to decision-making. The process begins with a small circle of leaders making a decision autonomously (Decide), without involving or consulting members of the organization or stakeholders. Only once the decision has been consolidated does the announcement follow (Announce), which is often one-way, with leaders communicating the decision without allowing room for counterarguments or meaningful discussion. At that point, leaders prepare to defend the decision against any criticism or resistance (Defend).

The approach is defensive and reactive: leaders seek to convince others of the validity of the decision, rather than incorporating feedback or suggestions. This method can lead to various problems, including a lack of involvement and acceptance by the rest of the people concerned and potential internal conflicts. A famous example of this syndrome is what happened with the Turin-Lyon high-speed rail link. But we need only look at the capital itself to find other more recent examples, starting with the protests against the quadrupling of the railway line between Capannelle and Casilina in the Appia Antica Regional Park or the TVA tram in the historic center (Termini-Vaticano-Aurelio line).

News of conflicts relating to opposition to infrastructure projects decided with a DAD approach (TAV Turin-Lyon; railway works in the Appia Antica Regional Park; the tram in the historic center of Rome)

The Penelope syndrome, on the other hand, takes its name from the famous character in Homer’s Odyssey, who wove a web by day and unraveled it by night to avoid making a decision about her suitors. This syndrome refers to projects that are never completed because, often due to changes in administration (public or corporate), the decision-making process is cyclically questioned and restarted from scratch. Everything that has been done or chosen by the previous administration is questioned without solid justification, continually postponing the decision and changing content, objectives, and plans. A fitting example of this type of syndrome can be found in the bridge over the Strait of Messina, but also in the long-standing issue of the railway ring of Rome.

An article from the blog “Abitare a Roma” (Living in Rome)

4. From syndromes to consequences: dissent

These syndromes, Cascetta continues, lead to the creation of different types of “consensus barriers.” The most famous is NIMBY (Not in My Backyard), which expresses opposition to the construction of works near one’s residence or local community, even though in theory their importance is recognized (great initiative, but do it somewhere else). But there are more acute versions: the BANANA syndrome, or Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anything, expresses total opposition to the project itself. Not only do people not want anything to be changed ‘in their backyard’, but anywhere.

One example in this field is road pricing: a theoretically desirable tool, but one that has only been implemented in a very few cities, including Milan, and even then only in a small portion of the territory. It is a policy that has been proposed in hundreds of cities, but is systematically blocked because there is not enough consensus to implement it: suffice it to say that in Rome, it has been supposed to be implemented since 2017.

All these failures are partly due to the wrong way of making decisions.

5. Recognizing the disease: cognitive biases

We all make decisions all the time without being aware of it: these are biases cognitive, which form the basis of entire disciplines. Cascetta states: “Man is not a rational animal, he is an animal that rationalizes: we are full of biases. It is only afterwards that we try to compare and analyze the alternatives and arrive at an informed solution.”

In psychology and behavioral economics, in fact, researchers have long been studying how to exploit cognitive biases to make better choices: we discussed this here). This is known as nudging, i.e., techniques that aim to influence people’s decisions in a subtle and non-coercive way, steering them towards choices that are considered better for the individuals themselves or for society. A practical and widespread example of nudging is the positioning of healthier foods at eye level in school canteens or supermarkets, to steer people towards healthier food consumption.

Nudging techniques implemented in Tesco stores

In the field of public engagement, for example, a bias called the Ikea Effect is used: if you participate personally in the construction of something, you will develop an emotional bond with it that increases its value and importance. Involving people in the decision-making process means creating a sense of belonging, making them more likely to support the project or final decision.

The Ikea Effect, illustrated and explained in Howie Mann’s blog

In the field of decision-making processes, over 200 types of bias have been identified, 50 of which are now well established. These include:

• Authority Bias: the tendency to give excessive weight to the opinions and suggestions of figures of authority, often at the expense of one’s own judgment or expertise.
• Curse of Knowledge: the difficulty experts have in putting themselves in the shoes of those who do not have the same information. When you are familiar with a topic, you tend to assume that everyone else is too, using technical terms or advanced concepts, skipping fundamental explanations or not providing sufficient context. The result is ineffective communication that prevents the adequate transmission of knowledge.

Both are biases that systematically lead to DAD syndrome.

Other types of biases that more commonly lead to planning fallacies are also:

• Optimist Bias: this is the “tendency to see the glass as half full,” i.e., to overestimate the probability of positive events and underestimate the probability of negative events. This leads people to distort data and reality to support their decision, leading to choices that are not based on a realistic assessment of probabilities.
• Sunk Cost Fallacy: this is the tendency to invest more in projects on which resources have already been spent, even if they lead to negative results, rather than changing investments (if there has been an expense, the work must be finished, even if it is wrong!).

The sunk cost fallacy explained by The Decision Lab

6. But how do we decide?

There are many models: starting with the irrational one, which does not involve any comparison of alternatives or awareness of why certain decisions are made.

In the rational model, on the other hand, the game is between the designer and the decision-maker. A typical example is cost-benefit analysis. The professor says: “This is what you see in all textbooks as a planning model. Well, it doesn’t work!”. The risk is once again the DAD syndrome. “The aim is to achieve an ‘optimal’ situation, i.e., the best cost-benefit ratio. Needless to say, however, in most cases the costs and benefits cannot be measured, are not quantified or quantifiable, and decisive factors are often overlooked.” It is said that “without data, you are just another person with an opinion,” but data alone is not enough.

This is where more participatory decision-making processes, known as cognitive, come into play: Technicians, Decision-makers, and Stakeholders interact to arrive not at the optimal solution, but at a solution that satisfies all parties involved: a model that GO-Mobility has been experimenting with for years with a now well-established approach. The quality of the decision is therefore dictated by the level of consensus achieved.

7. Towards a cure: We need Data (& Methods)

In all the rational processes described, data is needed: but above all, quantitative methods are needed, i.e., the combination of data, mathematical models, and interpretative analysis. “These three elements must complement each other: because data, without someone who knows how to read it, can be very ambiguous. To understand what is happening, interpretation is needed.”

In summary, what role can quantitative methods play in decision-making processes in the field of transport?

Prevention is better than cure: first and foremost, they can support an accurate analysis of the current situation. An analysis based solely on future assumptions is weak. But in order to have valid and neutral analyses, they must not be occasional and preparatory to specific plans and projects: observers must be set up, entities that repeatedly and cyclically collect and analyze data. Otherwise, yet another bias emerges, namely the priming effect: exposure to certain stimuli conditions subsequent choices, and this happens when data is collected with a specific approach and purpose that then, unintentionally, stays with us forever.

Comprehensibility: data and models must be understandable to everyone in order to avoid the Curse of Knowledge. It is part of the planning process to make a communicative, analytical, and infographic effort to transform data into something understandable to non-experts. It is the role of technicians and administrators to ensure that those interested in participating are able to understand the content under discussion.

Finally, of great importance is the need for models to contain all the important elements. Not only those that are important to technicians and decision-makers, but also to those who will suffer (or benefit) from the effects of that decision: accessibility, equity, social and environmental impact are essential elements for making decisions that are not only informed, but also shared and supported by the people who will most experience the consequences.

Reference bibliography: Ennio Cascetta, Armando Cartenì, Francesca Pagliara, Marcello Montanino: “A new look at planning and designing transportation systems: A decision-making model based on cognitive rationality, stakeholder engagement and quantitative methods,” Transport Policy, Volume 38, 2015, pp. 27-39. Armando Cartenì, Vittorio Marzano, Ilaria Henke, Ennio Cascetta, “A cognitive and participative decision-making model for transportation planning under different uncertainty levels,” Transport Policy, Volume 116, 2022, pp. 386-398.