GO-Mobility

Start Fast, Fail Slow. 

The dark side of planning

The world of transportation is often characterized by so-called “megaprojects.” The experience gathered by @Bent Flyvbjerg in his book How Big Things Get Done, written with @Den Garber, discusses the relationship between megaprojects and the strategies with which they were planned. Flyvbjerg, an expert in their management, analyzes hundreds of real cases to identify the key principles that determine the success or failure of large enterprises.

The study shows how a long series of major infrastructure projects (from motorway tunnels to high-speed rail lines) have foundered due to the “Start Fast, Fail Slow” syndrome: hasty and partial planning, often driven by political urgency or technical enthusiasm. The alternative is well known, albeit less popular: think slow, act fast. This is an approach that we at GO-Mobility have understood and absorbed through years of experience: investing time and rigor in the design phase takes time, but it pays off in a more smooth and effective grounding of project ideas during the implementation. In practice, this means proceeding decisively only when the picture is completely clear: let’s look at this in detail.

The paradox of megaprojects

There is a systematic phenomenon that affects all megaprojects, which Flyberg defines as the “iron law of megaprojects“: the tendency to exceed the budget and/or deadlines characterizes 92% of megaprojects. Three elements in particular are involved:

• budget overruns compared to estimated costs;
• delays in relation to the estimated completion times;
• performance below

In this field, transport infrastructure projects — highways, railways, subways, airports — are often the worst offenders. The sector suffers from systematic underestimation of costs and overestimation of demand, caused by cognitive biases, political incentives, and poor planning. The text shows that, on average, transport infrastructure costs exceed estimates by 33%.

Flyvbjerg’s book lists many “syndromes” that afflict large-scale projects, a topic close to our hearts. As we discussed in the article “Facing our choices“, the cognitive bias of unrealistic optimism leads decision-makers to underestimate costs and timeframes while overestimating benefits.

What are the most common causes of this bias?

• Underestimation of actual costs: feasibility studies present optimistic figures, and promoters have an interest in minimizing costs in order to get the green light.
• Overestimation of demand: usage projections are excessively high, with unrealistic assumptions about the number of users or passengers;
• Irrational political decisions: projects are often launched without rigorous analysis, mainly for electoral reasons or for political visibility;
• Lack of modularity: the construction of large infrastructure projects is too customized, without taking advantage of standardized, tested, and scalable models.

Think Slow, Act Fast

The mistake common to these failures is starting implementation too early without a solid strategy. A key principle for the success of megaprojects is to devote more time to the planning phase (Think Slow) and, only once the plan is solid, execute quickly (Act Fast).

Those of us who work in the field of transport and mobility planning know how important it is to develop a thorough understanding of the situation and define a well-structured operational methodology. Whether it is a #SUMP or a feasibility study for an infrastructure project, every plan and project is part of a territorial, cultural, or demographic system that is different from the previous ones. There is no “one size fits all” approach: each system and issue needs to be studied in depth, dedicating time to detailed analysis of the context, dialogue with stakeholders, and planning of each activity.

Every project is more solid when it is participatory: our approach to design and participatory processes, illustrated in a few slides

The logic is always the same: avoid monolithic approaches and favor modular solutions based on evidence and the ability to predict and evaluate scenarios.  In this sense, the analysis of the worst-case scenario should not be underestimated, as it is often neglected in favor of unrealistic optimism. Flyvbjerg recommends always looking at similar projects carried out in the past, assuming that problems that have arisen repeatedly are likely to recur.

Beware of the most common syndromes

Referring back to syndromes, the author warns against the most common ones related to megaprojects.

Big Design Syndrome refers to the mistake of wanting to implement a project that is too ambitious and complex from the outset, instead of adopting a modular approach. The most successful projects are those that start small and grow over time. A virtuous example is the #Copenhagen subway, which was built in modular phases and with a progressive approach.

The Hollywood Syndrome or Star Wars Effect refers to the idea that a project will be more successful if it is hyper-innovative or revolutionary rather than using tried and tested solutions. Innovation is positive, but if too many new things are tried at once, the risk of failure increases. Example: Elon Musk’s famous Hyperloop project, a futuristic ultra-fast transport system in low-pressure tubes, which promised revolutionary mobility without ever having demonstrated its technical, economic, and operational feasibility on a real scale. Despite years of announcements and investments, no commercial version has ever been operational, and the potential costs remain very high. Similarly, Berlin’s new airport (BER) attempted to combine cutting-edge technology, iconic architecture, and untested solutions. The result? With delays of almost 10 years and huge cost overruns, it has become one of Europe’s symbols of failure due to overdesign. In contrast, a positive example is the Øresund Bridge between Denmark and Sweden, built without the ‘show-off’ ambitions typical of avant-garde architecture, which increase costs and timeframes without any real functional benefits (as Flyvbjerg argues, the obsession with ‘unique design’ is more typical of cinema than engineering, hence the name ‘Star Wars Effect’).

Three examples of megaprojects: two affected by the Star Wars Effect (above: Hyperloop and Berlin’s new airport) and one virtuous (Øresund Bridge).

The Start Fast, Fail Slow Syndrome, when a project is started in a great hurry for political or commercial reasons without adequate planning. This leads to a cycle of continuous revisions, corrections, and delays along the way. Are there any Italian examples that can be traced back to this syndrome? Work on Line C of the Rome metro line began in 2007 with an optimistic schedule that envisaged full opening by 2011. To date, only a few sections are operational, and the central section (San Giovanni–Colosseo–Piazza Venezia) has not yet been completed. What happened? Excavations began before the archaeological and urban planning survey was completed, even though it was known that the area crosses the monumental heart of the city. The project was continuously rewritten during construction, with costs rising from 3 billion to over 5 billion. Another famous example is the Salerno-Reggio Calabria motorway: started in the 1960s, it remained chronically unfinished for decades, subject to fragmentary interventions. Its conversion to the A2 highway in 2016 required a complete rethink, but only after years of emergency maintenance and uncoordinated work. Characterized by accelerated starts and fragmented funding, often without clear performance indicators, it is a historical example of incremental failure caused by premature beginnings and the absence of solid governance and systemic vision.

Two examples of megaprojects in Italy affected by the Start Fast, Fail Slow syndrome are Metro C in Rome and the Salerno-Reggio Calabria motorway.

Tunnel Vision Syndrome, on the other hand, is the tendency to focus excessively on a single dimension of the project—usually the technical or engineering aspect—ignoring fundamental external variables such as the political and institutional context, social and cultural dynamics, environmental or territorial implications, and organizational and management factors that could compromise it. An example cited by Flyvbjerg is the Big Dig project in Boston, a highway tunnel, where construction risks and hidden costs were overlooked, leading to a budget increase from $2.8 billion to over $22 billion.

Finally, there is the “political push” syndrome, which concerns projects that are launched not because they are really necessary, but because of their political or media value. In this case, costs are often deliberately underestimated in order to get the project approved, knowing that once it has started it will be difficult to stop it (the “fait accompli” strategy). Many Olympic Games and World Cups have gone over budget because of this syndrome: the 2016 Rio Olympics exceeded the expected costs by more than 50%; those in Paris by 115%.

Shaping decisions without forcing them

Good planning means creating the conditions for decisions to mature in an informed, transparent, and resilience-oriented manner. It means avoiding the myth of the “momentous turning point” and recognizing instead the value of patient, step-by-step construction, where each step makes sense only if it is supported by reliable data and robust, shared scenarios.

The new approach to transport system planning, supported by authors such as Prof. @Ennio Cascetta, Prof. @Armando Cartenì, Prof. @Francesca Pagliara, and Prof. @Marcello Montanino, goes beyond the traditional technical focus to propose an integrated decision-making model that combines cognitive rationality, stakeholder involvement, and quantitative methods. This approach criticizes the purely engineering-based approach adopted in addressing the complexity of transport systems. It emphasizes the importance of placing social and technical perspectives on an equal footing, integrating cognitive and management sciences into the analysis of transport systems, and emphasizing the need to consider qualitative impacts, the use of language that is accessible even to “non-experts,” and ex-post evaluation tools.

In this sense, doing big things well does not mean chasing complexity, but defusing it where possible. And this is where our idea of consulting comes into play: not providing definitive answers, but co-constructing solid, measurable, and adaptable paths.